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ChapterS

Wrongful Life and Procreative Decisions
Bonnie Steinbock

Abstract This paper defends and refines the claim that procreation can be wrongful.

Procreation is wrongful first when the "nonexistence condition" is met: the person's
life will be filled with suffering that cannot be ameliorated or empty of all the
things that make life worth living. Recognizing that this condition is rarely met,
the paper then argues that it is wrong to create a person in less extreme circum-

stances: when the person is likely not to have a minimaHy decent life, one in which
certain important interests cannot be satisfied. Although we must be very cautious
about concluding that any particular impairment precludes a minimally decent life,
there will be circumstances in which a future life is unlikely to hold a reasonable
promise of containing the things that make human lives good. In these circumstances, and if reproduction is avoidable, we are required to forego reproduction
altogether.
Keywords Harm· Benefit· Interests· Rights. Minimally decent life· Non-identity
problem.

8.1 Introduction
Many people would agree that if a child is going to born under very disadvantageous
conditions, it would be wrong to reproduce, and indeed a wrong to that future child.
However, it turns out to be surprisingly difficult to support this claim, in cases where
nothing can be done to prevent the disadvantageous condition, except to prevent the
child's birth altogether. To capture this unique feature, David Heyd terms these cases

"genesis problems."l The precise nature of genesis problems is explained below in
Section 8.3, The Philosophical Problem. I will start, however, by pointing out that
genesis problems challenge some widely held intuitions, and raise the following
question: when it is likely that the child will be born under adverse conditions, and
has "no other way of getting born," can concern for the welfare of the child ground

an obligation to avoid reproduction?
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By "obligation to avoid reproduction," I mean an obligation to avoid the deliberate or intentional conception of a child. I am not addressing the question of whether
abortion can ever be moraHy required of a woman, because that is a much more

complicated issue, which turns on such issues as the moral status of the unborn and
the woman's right of self-determination. There is no consensus about either issue.
For some, a fetus is morally equivalent to a born child. It would be no more permisSIble to abort the fetus, out of concern for its welfare, than to kill a born child. For
those who regard the fetus as having a lesser moral status, abortion is permissible
for a range of reasons, including the welfare of the future child. However, even for
those who think that abortion can be justified in certain cases by concern for the
welfare of the child, it does not follow that abortion would be morally obligatory in
those cases, i.e., that the decision not to abort would be morally wrong. For example
a justification for abortion might be that the woman already has as many childre~
as she can care for. Given a pro-choice perspective, the decision to abort would be
permissible, but the opposite decision not to abort would not be immoral. These
are decisions that are, for the most part, up to the women who have to make them.
The right to bodily selt~determination certainly includes a right not to be forced to
have an abortion, but, I would argue, it also includes a right to make one's own
moral decision about abortion. This is not to say that every abortion decision is
morally correct. It is possible to imagine ill-considered abortions, or abortions done
for mor~l1y ba~ reas,ons. although such cases are most likely rare in real life. 2 It may
be possIble to Imagine a morally bad decision to continue a pregnancy, but for the
most part, such decisions are not considered immoral, and it would be unusual, to
say the least: to claim that a pregnant woman has an obligation to kill the fetus, out of
concern for Its future well-being. By contrast, it is not at all odd or unusual to suggest
that starting a pregnancy in disadvantageous circumstances would be irresponsible
and indeed unfair to the future child. It is this judgment about conceiving a child
that I examine in this paper, where the decision to procreate is clearly intentional
and voluntary. This will have implications for the scope and limits of procreative
liberty, and for ethical judgments about risk in assisted reproduction.
For example, the main objection to reproductive cloning in the National Advisory Bioethics Commission's report was an unacceptable level of risk of serious
defects in offspring.' The question of risk to offspring also comes up in the President's Council on Bioethics' White Paper on alternative sources of stein cells. One
proposal is based on an analogy with pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD).
It sug~ests that one or two stem cells could be removed from an embryo without
damaging the embryo. The embryo then could be implanted to start a pregnancy.
Although PGD is widely regarded as safe, the President's Council rejected the pro~osal, prImanly on the ground that in the absence of long-tenn safety studies, it
IS not possible to determine conclusively that embryo biopsy is safe for the future
child 4
Objections to reproduction under adverse conditions can be based on emotional
as well as physical harm. For example, critics of postmenopausal motherhood have
argued that a woman who has a child in her fifties or even sixties might not be able to
be an adequate parent. How, they ask, will she handle a rambunctious two-year-old
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or a rebellious teen? Moreover, women who have babies in their sixties may not
live to see their children grow up. Art Caplan has suggested imposing age limits for
infertility treatment,' to avoid creating children who will be orphaned at a young
age. In addition, he argues that even if these children are not orphaned before adulthood, they are likely to be prematurely burdened with the care of an elderly parent.
Is it fair to the children, he asks, to have such old mothers?

8.2 How Bad Is It?
Much of the debate centers on empirical questions that relate to the badness of
the hannful condition, including how severe the harm is, and how likely is it to
occur. But these are not the only questions, since we should also ask whether the
harm can be lessened, even if not prevented entirely. Having an older mother is
not ideal for children, perhaps, but surely it is not a tragedy either. Today, it is not
uncommon for women in their forties to have babies. Perhaps in ten years, motherhood in one's fifties will not be a rarity. As women live (and are healthy) into their
eighties and even nineties, the "orphan objection" may no longer be an o~jection to
postmenopausal motherhood. In addition, many older women have had to take on
the job of raising their grandChildren, and have done a pretty good job. If they can
be good child rearers, it would seem that postmenopausal women can be good (or
good enough) mothers as well.

8.3 The Philosophical Problem
The truth is, we often do not have very reliable evidence about the impact of
these various technologies and arrangements on offspring. Sometimes objections
are based on Ugut reactions" and a fear of what's unusual, rather than solid empirical
evidence. Sometimes they are based on stereotypical thinking and prejudice: gay and
lesbian couples have been prevented from using infertility services and adoption,
6
because of an unfounded belief that they cannot be good parents. We should be
very careful in attempting to assess the empirical questions regarding the impact on
offspring, to avoid unnecessarily depriving individuals of the right to have children.
However, there is a deeper philosophical issue raised by all of these examples
because the technology or arrangement that results in the child's being born in a
harmful or disadvantageous condition is at the same time the condition of the child's
being born at all. Thus, the examples under discussion differ importantly from other
examples of prenatal harming, where something can be done to prevent the harm
to the child. For example, a pregnant woman can reduce the risk of prematurity
or low birth weight (which are associated with various health risks) in her baby
by not smoking or drinking alcohol. She can lessen the risk her child will have a
neural tube disorder by getting enough folic acid in her diet. In fact, she can do
this even before she gets pregnant. The fact that the child does not yet exist is not
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the relevant factor. What is important is that the harm can be prevented. The child
who is harmed when the harm could have been prevented has, in most cases, a
legitimate grievance against the individual or individuals who could have prevented
the harm. By contrast, in genesis cases, nothing can be done to prevent the harm to
this child. It's life with the disadvantage or no life at all. And that makes the question
of whether bringing the child into existence in a harmful condition is "unfair to the
child" a much more difficult one.

Genesis problems are particularly vexing because

OUf

intuitions often go one

way, while the arguments seem to go another. Another motive for examining genesis
problems is that they have profound implications for ethical theory, in particular, the
explanation of why wrong acts are wrong. On one plausible ethical view, acts that
are wrong must be wrong for someone. Moral principles, on this view, must concern the interests of individuals; they must be "person-affecting.,,7 Genesis problems
pose a challenge to this assumption because they seem to provide examples of wrong
acts that are not a wrong or a harm to anyone.
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that is, on balance, worth living, from the child's own perspective, despite whatever
disadvantages it has, then, Robertson maintains, its life logically cannot be regarded
as a harm or wrong to the child.
I am not concerned with the tort of wrongful life here, or the question of whether
such cases can fit under traditional understandings of tort law. I I The primary issue in
wrongful life cases is whether the infant plaintiff deserves compensation,12 whereas
my concern in this paper is procreative responsibility, and whether there is an obligation not to have a child in the first place. Still, wrongful life cases are useful for
understanding how birth in very disadvantageous conditions can plausibly be seen
as a harm or a wrong to the child.

8.4.2 Feinberg's Counterfactual Analysis of Harming

John Robertson, perhaps the best-known advocate for procreative liberty, has argued
that banning risky procreative technologies or arrangements out of concern for the
welfare of offspring makes no sense. 8 As Robertson puts it, "But for the technique in
question, the child never would have been born. Whatever psychological or social
problems arise, they hardly rise to the level of severe handicap or disability that
would make the child's very existence a net burden, and hence a wrongfullife.,,9
However well-meaning, the attempt to protect children by preventing their births is
illogical.

The idea that children can be harmed by being born may seem incoherent. For to
say that the child has been harmed by being born is to say that the child has been
made worse off. But how can someone be made worse off by coming to exist?
Nonexistence is not a better condition to be in; it is no condition at all. This suggests
that it is impossible to harm someone by causing him to exist.
Joel Feinberg suggests that this conclusion comes from failing to distinguish
between two interpretations of what it is to make someone worse off. On one interpretation, which Feinberg calls the "worsening condition," to make someone "worse
off" is to make him worse off than he was. Clearly, the worsening condition cannot
be satisfied in the wrongful life situation. No one can be worse off than he was
before he existed, since this suggests comparing the existing individual with himself
before he existed, which is absurd. However, to make him worse off can also be
interpreted counterfactually where it means "worse off than he would have been."
The counterfactual claim is that the child would have been better off not coming
into existence, or "better off unborn." Before explaining what this might mean, let
us consider an objection to the counterfactual analysis of harming.

The extent to which this view differs from conventional thinking cannot be overstated. Virtually every professional society or national commission or oversight
group that has considered the matter takes for granted that expected impact on

8.4.3 Harris's Objection

8.4 Preventing Births to Protect Children
8.4.1 Robertson's Analysis

offspring must be taken into consideration in determining the permissibility of a
reproductive treatment or arrangement. The British Human Fertilization & Embryology Act of 1990 explicitly provides that a "woman shall not be provided with
treatment services unless account has been taken of the welfare of any child who
may be born as a result of the treatment (including the need of that child for a
father), and of any other child who may be affected by the birth."10 It is not clear
precisely what is meant by "taking account of the welfare of the child": for example,
how severe or likely the harm would have to be to deny treatment services. However,
the mention of "the need of that child for a father" suggests that all sorts of social
factors should be considered, and could justify denial of treatment. By contrast,
on Robertson's account, the procreative liberty of individuals can be limited only
when the predicted harm would constitute a "wrongful life." If the child has a life

John Harris rejects the counterfactual analysis as unnecessarily complicated. To be
harmed, according to Harris, is simply to be put in a condition that is harmful. He
writes. "I would want to claim that a hanned condition obtains wherever someone
is in a disabling or hurtful condition, even though that condition is only marginally
disabling and even though it is not possible for that particular individual to avoid
the condition in question,"13 To harm someone. on Harris's account, is just to be
responsible, causally and morally, for the person's being in that harmed condition.
Harris's account seems counterintuitive, as is revealed in the following pair of
examples, In the first example. a woman who is a smoker continues to smoke during her pregnancy, despite knowing the risk of causing asthma in her child. If the
child is born asthmatic, she has harmed her child, in a straightforward sense of
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"harm"; the child has been made worse off by the woman's behavior. He or she
could have been born without asthma, if the woman had stopped smoking during
pregnancy. 14 Contrast this case with a woman who has asthma because of a genetic
predisposition." She decides to have a child, hoping that her child will not inherit
her genetic predisposition, but well aware that any child she has might be asthmatic.
On Harris's analysis, if she has a child who has asthma, she too has harmed her
child, and just as much as the woman who continues to smoke during pregnancy.
She is causally responsible for the child's being born with asthma, as well as morally
responsible, in the sense that she knew of the risk and (let us assume) chose to keep
smoking when she could have stopped.
Harris's analysis. which equates the two cases, seems quite wrong. The difference is that the smoker could have prevented her baby being born with asthma,
while the non-smoking asthmatic could not. The only way she could prevent the
birth of a child with asthma would be to avoid having a child at all. Not only does
Harris's analysis fail to distinguish between the two ex.amples, but it has the counterintuitive implication that virtually an of us harm our children, because all of us
pass on genes associated with disadvantageous, though not disastrous, conditions,
such as nearsightedness, acne, or allergies. To have a child, on this view, is to harm

him or her,I6
Responding to this objection. Harris agrees that his account makes all parents
causally responsible for the harms they genetically transmit, but maintains that this
sense of "responsible" is trivial. Parents are not morally responsible for the harms

they cause "unless they were, first, aware that they were likely to transmit those
harms and, second, aware of a better alternative child, or a better possible alternative
child, and could, realistically, have produced that child instead."17
I do not dispute Harris's claim about moral responsibility for harm. However,
while! agree that one may be morally responsible for having a child in a harmful
condition if one could have substituted a different child (see below Section 8.7.2),
it is hard to see how the possibility of substitution can be a condition of causal
responsibility for harm. How does the fact that one could have avoided the harmful
condition, by bringing a different child into existence make it the case that if one
fails to make the substitution, one has harmed this child? How does the existence
of a better option affect whether this child is harmed by being born? The existence
of a better option, and the failure to adopt it, may be part of an argument that one
has behaved irresponsibly or wrongly, but it is hard to see what role it plays in an
argument that the child born with a disadvantageous 'condition, who could not have
been born in a better condition, has been hanned.
To show that the child has been harmed, we need a counterfactual analysis like
Feinberg's, which aims at explaining how it is possible for someone to be "better off unborn."l8 The first step is to ask what this means. Many people find the
expression "better off unborn" baffling. They maintain that since we cannot compare
the child's impaired condition with non-existence, it makes no sense to say of any
individual that he or she would be better off never having come into existence. To
address this conundrum, Feinberg suggests that we think about a comparable claim,
"better off dead." The phrase "better off dead" does not express the absurd idea that
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non-existence is a better condition for someone to be in than life; non-existence
is not a condition of a person at all. Rather, the phrase expresses the idea that
sometimes the burdens of life outweigh the benefits-that from the individual's own
perspective, life is not worth living.
While it is fairly easy to understand what this means in the case of a competent
adult, it is trickier to be able to claim, with any certainty, that a never-competent
infant would be "better off dead." Infants lack the cognitive ability to have complex
preferences, such as "! prefer death to life under such-and-such conditions," making
it extremely difficult to say, on behalf of an infant, that he is better off dead or that
it is better for him to die. John Robertson provides the provocative example of a
child who is profoundly retarded, nonambulatory, blind, deaf, and who will spend
a brief life in a crib on the back wards of a state institution. (This last is a social
factor which could be ameliorated and so is not really relevant, but! leave it in as
it is part of his example.) Robertson says that although you and ! might find such a
life horrible to contemplate, and might prefer death, the child, who has known no
other existence, might disagree. "Life and life alone, whatever its limitations, might
be of sufficient worth to him." 19
It appears that two conditions are necessary for us to be able to assert with any
confidence that an infant is better off dead: excruciating physical pain and such a
brief life span that the child is unable to develop any compensating abilities. Such
conditions are very unusual. Most newborns who have serious disabling conditions
do not have lives that will be pure torture. Nevertheless, there are some cases in
which it is possible accurately to predict that they will. Given a choice between a
brief life filled with nothing but severe and unrelievable pain, we can say, sadly, that
the baby would be better off dead. If the baby would be better off dead, it seems
that the baby would be better off unborn. We should, however, examine the notion
·of what it is to be "better off unborn" a bit more closely.

8.5 The Nonexistence Condition

8.5.1 A Testfor Harm
As noted above, the claim "better off unborn" does not refer to any preference the
impaired infant actually has. Instead, this claim is one that would be made on behalf
of the infant plaintiffs by proxy choosers who act as advocates for the infants, concerned to promote their overall welfare. The proxy choosers are not to substitute
their own views of what makes life worth living. They are not to think about the
conditions under which they would prefer nonexistence. Rather, they are to view
things, as much as possible, from the children's perspective. 2o The judgment that
these children would be "better off unborn" is warranted if aU the children's interests (whatever they might be) are inexorably doomed to defeat by their incurable
condition. ''Thus,'' Feinberg says, "it would be irrational-contrary to what reason
decrees-for a representative and protector of those interests to prefer the continuance of that condition to nonexistence."21 Let us call this standard the nonexistence
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condition. If the nonexistence condition is fulfilled, the child has been harmed, and
therefore wronged, by birth.
The question I want to consider now is whether a child can be said to be harmed
or wronged by birth only if the nonexistence condition is satisfied. Consider the
following example. After years of trying to have a child, an infertile couple resorts
to IVF and is able to have a much-loved child, Junior. Unfortunately, Junior turns

out to have an inherited disorder that causes a massive failure of bone marrow cell
production, and can lead to leukemia. Junior is healthy at present, but he probably
will need a bone marrow transplant in the future, and possibly a kidney transplant
as well. As it happens, the couple has several leftover embryos in storage and one is
both disease-free and a perfect tissue match. The couple hires a surrogate to bring
the embryo to term, with the idea that the child will be a source of bone marrow
for Junior. They do not neglect or abuse "Donor" (as they name him). They just do
not feel about him as they do about Junior. Indeed, they consciously suppress any
tender feelings toward Donor since that might inhibit them in using him as a source
of organs for Junior, should the need arise. Unlike real-life cases," where children
have been conceived as "savior siblings," but also loved for themselves as members
of the family, this couple never intended to love Donor. If the couple did not want
Donor as anything but a source of spare parts, they should not have had him in the
first place. What they did was wrong, and moreover, a wrong to poor Donor.
On Robertson's analysis, however, it seems that Donor has not been harmed or
wronged. If Donor were to complain of his lonely, loveless existence, his parents.
could point out that, had they not needed the bone marrow for Junior. Donor would
not be here today. He'd still be a frozen embryo. Admittedly, Donor's life is pretty
bad, but he does not want to die, nor would he prefer never to have been born. Since
the nonexistence condition is not met, Donor has not been harmed or wronged by
birth. That, I would argue, is completely implausible. The fact that Donor does not
long for death or regret having been born surely does not get his parents off the
moral hook. But is this example a counter-example to Robertson? Not necessarily.
For it may be possible to treat these examples so that they fall under the sorts of
ordinary person-affecting principles that Robertson himself seems to rely on. This
approach is taken by Melinda Roberts 23

8.5.2 A Person-Affecting Solution: The Third
Option Approach
Like Robertson, Melinda Roberts believes that the nonexistence condition must be
fulfilled for existence to be a harm or wrong to a child who has no other way of being
born. However, she thinks that Robertson mistakenly assumes that if the progenitors
would not have reproduced except under the conditions as presented, the child's only
alternatives are life with the disadvantage or no life at all. His mistake is to focus
exclusively on what the couple would have done, instead of on what they could have
done. If they could have brought the child to birth in a better condition, then they
have harmed and wronged him. Perhaps this strategy can be used with the example
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of Donor. It could be argued that Donor's options are not only either (I) life as an
unloved child or (2) nonexistence. There's a third alternative: life as a loved and
wanted child. The couple's failure to choose this third option makes Donor worse
off than he could have been and explains why he has been harmed and wronged.
Roberts' analysis is consistent with the robust moral intuition that Donor's parents acted in an appalling fashion. It is not clear, however, that her strategy for
deriving this conclusion is successful. It depends on whether a third option was
in fact available to the Donor's parents. Certainly they could have treated Donor
better. They could have treated him the same as Junior. But could they have loved
Donor? Saying "they should have had him and loved him" sounds a little like the
parental admonition to "eat it and like it," which has at least the ring of paradox.
However, in my example, this third option is not realistically available, since the
whole point of having Donor is a; a source of spare parts for Junior. His parents
deliberately avoid developing tender feelings for Donor so that such feelings will
not get in the way if Junior needs his organs. Thus, it seems that a "third option" is
not available to Donor's parents-they could not have had him and loved him in the
circumstances-and therefore, on Roberts' analysis, they did nothing wrong. This,
however, is morally outrageous. Having Donor as a source of spare parts for Junior
is wrong, even if the resulting child does not want to die, even if he regards his life
as on balance, worth living.

8.5.3 The Decent Minimum Standard
A more plausible criterion for "rightful" birth than the nonexistence condition is one
in which life is actually a benefit to the child, as opposed to a life that is wretched,
although still worth living. For life to be a positive benefit, certain minimal conditions must be satisfied, and therefore we can call this criterion for responsible
procreation the "decent minimum standard." A decent minimum is reached only
if life holds a reasonable promise of containing the things that make human lives
good: an ability to experience pleasure, to learn, to have relationships with others.
If someone's life will be inevitably and irremediably bereft of many of these goods,
then we do that person no favor by bringing him or her into existence; indeed,
knowingly and voluntarily to conceive a child under such conditions is a harm and
a wrong to the person. This aspect of the decent minimum standard focuses on the
child's capacities for a good human life. In addition, the ability to be a good enough
parent is also part of the decent minimum. I maintain that it is wrong, irresponsible
procreation, to have a child if one knows that one lacks either the ability to love the
child or the capacity to care properly for him or her. 24
It might be argued that building into a decent minimum the ability to love one's
children is implausible, since many people have parents who did not love them, but
who still have lives well worth Jiving. Indeed, in some cases of artists, writers, or
actors, what makes their lives well worth living is a talent that derives precisely
from having been deprived of parental love. If children can have lives that are well
worth Hving, despite inadequate parenting, how is it possible to maintain that their

164

B. Steinbock

parents wronged them by having them? In response, I would argue that, while it is
possible that a child may flourish, even without parental love, the foreseeable result
is that the child will have a very diminished life. Most children need a secure basis
of (at least) mother-love to be psychologically healthy. Without that basis, they are
likely to have profound feelings of unworthiness and self-loathing, which make it
difficult or impossible for them to have healthy relationships with others. No one
should impose that on a child right from the start, not if it can be avoided. Where
the only way to avoid giving a child that kind of diminished life is to avoid his or
her birth, that is the responsible choice to make. 25
The intuition behind the decent minimum standard is that children have a right
to something more than lives that are barely worth living, and individuals have a
corresponding obligation not to have children under sufficiently awful conditions.
Granted, no one can guarantee that one's child will be happy, and the mere possibility of hardship and burden does not make procreation wrong. At the same
time, if individuals know, or should know, that they cannot provide their children
with minimally good lives, then they should refrain from procreation, where this is
possible. 26
The idea motivating this principle is that becoming a parent is not solely. or even
primarily, a right. It is also, and primarily, an awesome responsibility. Prospective
parents must think not simply of their own reproductive interests, but also of the
welfare of their offspring, and this means thinking about the kinds of lives their
children are likely to have. To bring a child into the world knowing that a decent
minimum cannot be achieved is wrong; indeed, it is a wrong to the child.
To say that birth is a wrong to, or unfair to, the child suggests that the child has an
interest in not being born. But how should we understand this interest? We certainly
can ascribe to individuals an interest in not having lives that it would be contrary
to reason to prefer, i.e., lives that meet the nonexistence condition. What I am suggesting here is that we can also say that people have an interest in not having lives
that fall above the nonexistence condition, if they fall below the decent minimum
standard. That is, it is not only lives that amount to pure torture that it is reasonable
to reject, from the perspective of preconception existence, but also lives that are
not minimally decent. If this is right, then it is possible to ascribe to individuals an
interest in minimally decent lives, and to say that if they are knowingly brought into
the world when this interest cannot be met, they have been wronged.
The question remains, how bad is too bad? At what point would it be wrong,
unfair to the child, to bring him or her into the world? This is an issue on which
reasonable people can disagree, at least about cases in the middle. We can expect
considerable (though probably not unanimous) consensus about lives that fall well
below a decent minimum (e.g., Robertson's deaf, blind, paralyzed, and profoundly
retarded child), as well as consensus about lives that, despite certain disadvantages,
fall well above (e.g., having asthma or being very nearsighted). However, we can
expect disagreement about cases in-between, conditions such as Down syndrome,
cystic fibrosis (CF), spina bifida, achondroplasia. On the one hand, prospective parents should be realistic about the burdens and limits such conditions may impose.
Their desire to have a biological child is not the only relevant factor. On the other

8 Wrongful Life and Procreative Decisions

165

hand, there are many individuals with serious disabilities who have lives that are
well worth living. Having a disability, even a serious one, does not entail life below
a decent minimum. Prospective parents who can provide their child with a life well
worth living, despite a disease or disability, are not morally required to abstain from
procreation. What they cannot do is claim that, on the grounds that the nonexistence
condition will not be met, the prospect of a harmful condition is morally irrelevant
to their decision.
Someone might ask why we should not raise the standard and say that prospective parents have an obligation to give their children lives that are, not just at the
decent minimum level, but something much better than that? After all, we think that
parents ought to make sacrifices for their children's health, education, and general
welfare. They are poor excuses for parents if they settle for a decent minimum once
the children are born; why not say that procreation is wrong unless offspring can
be reasonably expected to have very good lives, lives considerably above a decent
minimum?
It would be morally permissible to avoid having children under adverse conditions, on my view, since there is no moral obligation to have children at all.
Refraining from having children is not something that needs justification. The question is whether individuals have an obligation to forego reproduction altogether, if
the child is likely to experience physical or psychological harm. It seems to me that
the higher one sets the bar, the less plausible it is that there is such an obligation.
Why are individuals morally required to give up their dream of becoming parents,
especially if they can be wonderful parents, simply because the child is likely to
have more than the usual set of problems?
The nonexistence condition is arguably the right standard for ending someone's
life, precisely because it is so restrictive. 27 Euthanasia-for example, killing an
infant with serious defects-would only be justified if we had very good reason to
think that the child's life would be unbearable. However, the nonexistence condition
does not seem to be a reasonable standard for bringing someone into existence. That
is, there seems to be an asymmetry between ending and starting a person's existence
that is relevant to the morality of procreative decisions.

8,504 The Asymmetry Between Ending and Starting Lives
Existence makes a difference. We need not concern ourselves here with the thorn)
question of when a human being comes into existence, whether at conception OJ
sometime during pregnancy, at birth, or sometime after birth. Whenever an indio
vidual comes into existence, the point I am making here is that ceasing-ta-exist anc
never-coming-to-exist are not the same thing. Cynthia Cohen explains ilie differenc,
this way:
Death is terrible, in part, because it prevents us from baving future goods that we would
have had if we had remained alive. The awfulness of death is also grounded in the fact that
it robs us of those goods that we already have. Preconception nonexistence, on the other
hand, does not involve the loss of life's goods, nor does it deprive us of goods that we
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already possess. There is no loss incurred by possible children who are not brought into the
world, for there is no actual "we" who CQuld suffer such a loss at this pOint. 2!1

There is a natural and widespread reluctance to relinquish life, even under the
worst conditions. There is a tendency to "cling to life" even when its burdens are
great and its benefits marginal. Because we know that people generally prefer to
go on living, even when life is filled with suffering, the standard for saying that a
person's life is not worth living, or that he or she would be better off dead, should
be set quite high. The question we must ask is, "Is life better than death for this
individual?" From a pre-conception standpoint, however, the standard is different,
because we need not consider the tendency to cling to life, and to want to go on
existing, even under the most miserable of conditions. Death is bad for people who
want to go on living, but never-existing is not bad for anyone. We do not grieve for
the limitless numbers of people who never were born, and this is not callousness on
our part. There literally is no one to be sorry for! Of course, an infertile couple can
be anguished about not havi~g a child. but this sorrow, as real and intense as it may
be, is not the same as grieving for a child who died. In grieving for a child who dies,
there is the thought of the child's loss of life, as well as one's own grief in losing the
child.
What is the implication of this asymmetry for procreative decision-making? It is
this: If we are going to bring people into existence, we should be reasonably sure
that existence will benefit them, and this is not the case if their lives are barely
worth living. Hannful conditions which would never justify tenninating the life of
an infant can be excellent reasons for not having a child in the first place. The standard, then, for bringing people into the world should be higher than the standard for
ushering them out. People have a right not to be brought into the world, where their
births can be avoided, unless they can be reasonably assured of a decent minimum
of the goods that life has to offer.
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being fulfilled. However, I reject this Benthamite approach. 31 The claim is not thai
children are already protected by these rights, but that they should be. They are,
in Feinberg's term, "manifesto rights." Manifesto rights express moral ideals and
aspirations. When we say that hungry children have a right to be fed, we are nol
necessarily pointing to anyone in particular and saying, "You have the obligation
to feed these children." Certainly if a countty is too poor to provide its citizens the
basic necessities of life, its officials cannot be said to have an obligation to do so,
Rather, we use manifesto rights to express the moral claim that a world in which
children starve is morally unacceptable and should be changed.
Archard thinks that children who cannot enjoy a good number of the Rights of the
Child should not get born, and that those who deliberately conceive them under these
conditions wrong them. 32 However, this suggests that the very poor have a moral
obligation not to procreate at all, a claim John Harris calls "astonishing.,,33 I agree.
The very poor are already victims of injustice because of their economic situation.
To maintain that they have no right to "marry and found a farnily"-which, I mighl
point out, is also a fundamental human right34-is doubly unjust. Instead of seeing
the Rights of the Child as a minimal condition for morally pennissible procreation,
we should see it for what it is: an ideal. To say that all children ought to have these
rights is not to say that those who are less fortunate should not be born at all. It is te
say that all of us have an obligation to work toward improving the conditions undel
which too many children live.
So far, we have been considering situations in which the harm or disadvantage
can be avoided only by foregoing reproduction altogether. The moral situation is
quite different if it is possible to avoid the harmful condition and still become a
parent, for example, by delaying conception. In such a case, the harm is avoided by
having a different child. For this reason, it is referred to by Derek Parfit and others
as "the non-identity problem."

8.6 The Human Rights Approach

8.7 The Non-Identity Problem

Like Feinberg and me, David Archard argues that children have a birthright to a life
that is above a certain threshold. 29 However, instead of talking about basic interests
which are doomed to defeat, Archard sets "the threshold of a minimally acceptable
life as one in which the child has the reasonable prospect of enjoying a good number
of those rights possessed by all children," as outlined by the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. 30 Archard does not specify what those rights
are, which is perhaps not surprising. since there are dozens, including the right to
know and be cared for by his or her parents, the right to education, the right to rest
and leisure, the right to be protected from economic exploitation, and the right to
a standard of living adequate for the child's physical, mental, spiritual, moral and
social development.
Some have taken the position that it is meaningless to claim something as a
right when there is little or no prospect of the duty logically implied by the right

8.7.1 The Fourteen-Year-Old Girl35
Suppose a fourteen-year-old girl decides to get pregnant. Of course, most pregnancies of fourteen-year-old girls are not planned. They happen because very young
girls often do not have access to or take responsibility for birth control, or are in
denial about the possibility of becoming pregnant. Often pregnancies occur as the
result of relationships with men who are considerably older, where even the sexual
relationship itself may have been imposed. In such circumstances, it is far from c1eal
that the girl is fully responsible for becoming pregnant. Calling her responsible fO!
the pregnancy, or blaming her for having a child, may seem harsh or misplaced. So
let us imagine the unlikely scenario where the pregnancy is deliberate. She has nol
been pressured to have sex, and she has access to contraception. She decides nol
to use contraception, in order to have a baby, because of the prestige this would
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confer in her middle school. Let us imagine (even more unlikely!) that she attempts
to justify her plan to her mother. She says, "What's wrong with wanting a baby?
Why are you so opposed?"
Some mothers might respond that it i~ just wrong to have sex outside marriage.

below a decent minimum. How, then, can we justify the strong intuition that almost
everyone has. that It would be wrong deliberately to conceive a child at such a tender
age, and not Just wrong, but a wrong to the child?
James Woodward explains the unfairness in terms of failing to live up to the
parental obligatIOns the girl will have to her child.

But suppose this mother is not especially conservative about matters of sex. She

would like her daughter to wait until she is older to have sex, but even if she cannot
persuade her to wait to have sex, she certainly will try to persuade her to delay having a baby. One reason focuses on the hardships her daughter will likely experience.
Pregnancy imposes severe health strains on, and is more likely to have complications
in, girls who are not yet full-grown themselves. Moreover, she may have to drop out
of school to care for the baby, thus limiting her opportunities. In any event, having
a baby will deprive her of her adolescence, of spending time with friends, going out
at night, etc. If these self-regarding reasons do not persuade her daughter she ought
to wait, she should think about the effect on her parents who will probably end up
shouldering a great deal of the burden of child care long before they are ready to be
grandparents.
Finally, her mother will undoubtedly talk about the impact on the child of being
born to such a young mother. Babies born to very young girls are more likely to be
very low birth weight, and to be at greater risk of complications such as infection,
respiratory distress syndrome. neurological problems, gastrointestinal problems,

and sudden infant death syndrome. 36 The child is more likely to grow up in poverty,
without a father, and may suffer the associated disadvantages, such as truancy, trouble with the law, and increased risk of drug and alcohol abuse. In addition, few girls
of fourteen have the experience and maturity to be good mothers. Her mother might
say, "How can you have a baby? For heaven's sake, you couldn't take proper care
of your cat, remember? You never remembered to feed it or change the kitty litter.
If you don't care about your own future or our feelings, think of your baby. Having
a baby at your age is just not fair to the baby."
The girl might respond by refuting the charges of irresponsibility and inability
to care for the child. "That was two years ago!" she might say. "You never give me
credit for being responsible." Perhaps she has a point. At least in other cultures and
other times, fourteen~year-old girls can be good mothers. Shakespeare's Juliet was
deemed quite old enough to become a mother, and the same is true in many devel~
oping countries, where five-year-olds are entrusted with the care of their younger
siblings. 3?
But suppose that the girl does not defend her decision by claiming greater responsibility and maturity than her mother supposes she has. Instead she denies that this
is morally relevant. For while she is emotionally immature, she is very bright, and
has read Parfit, Harris, and Robertson. She says, "You're undoubtedly right. Given
my youth and immaturity, I probably will not be the ideal mother. I might even be
neglectful. I agree that I'd be a better mother to a child I'd have when I'm older and
more mature. But so what? I can't do better by that baby. If I wait until I'm twenty
and a better mother, I'll have a different baby. How can you say that my having a
baby now would be unfair to the child?" She has a point. It is extremely unlikely
that the nonexistence condition would be met, or even that the child's life would fall
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~i~; t~~~~ame ~e ~ve~ the. l4.ye?r~old girl} will-perhaps unavoidably_fail to give the

. .ve an a ~c~lon It reqUires, or Will fail to appreciate the importance of aivin
certam. kmds of tram~ng and educa~ion, or will be impatient with the child's de~and~
andlhYSIC~IlY or emotionally abuse It, or will neglect her child's nutritional or medical
nee ~. I ~Ialm th~t. when th~s is the case, Alma is roughly in the pOSition of someone who is
consldenng ma~mg a promIse about an extremely serious matter which she has aood reason
to ~xpe,ct she :"111. be unable fully to keep .... If Alma has her child and fails ~o
duties and obhgatlons she owes to her child, the child has a complaint against her ;::::~ t~~
a wrong done to the child.38
,
.

It

.

Woo?ward's claim that Alma wrongs her child is based on her failure to live up
to ~ertam dUhes and obligations she has to her child, and not on the claim that the
~Ild, Once born, will be miserable or prefer nonexistence. This expresses the idea
. at It IS pOSSible to wrong someone, or treat that person unfairly, even if he or she
IS,. on balance, bett~r off as a result. His approach has considerable appeal but it
raises the questIOn Just what one's obligations and duties toward a future child are
To put It anotherway, how good a parent would one have to be, or predict that on~
would be, to aVOId failIng 10 one's obligations?
Where the choice is between having a child and not having any child, as in the
case of th~ postmenopausal or HIV-positive woman, we might set the bar relatively
10:', th~t IS, at the decent minimum standard. Where the choice is between havin
thiS child and a later child to whom one would be a better parent, one mi ht ar u~
forsettl?g the bar somewhat higher. That is, one is not morally requirelto dJa
procreatIOn untIl one can provide the best possible care or be the best parent on~
~~Uld be .. That seems unduly pe~fectionist, as well as practically unrealizable. (If I
fo ve a child ~t age twenty-five, I II be physically more energetic than I would be at
rty, but I might have,~ore experience and patience at forty, When will I be "the
best parent I could be? ) A more plausible view is the more modest obligation not
to have a child until one will be able to be a "good enough" p
t J9
Ad·ffil·
-.
. . I cu ty With Woodward's explanation of the wrong to the child is that it is
limIted to cases where the prospective parent will be unable to fulfill her obligations
h
and dUlles to the child. What If the prospective parent could be a good
parent, but has .the option of having a different child in better circumstan~:~~~s
there an obligatIOn to have the "better-off" child and if so can this be
I· ed
in terms of a ri.ghts-violation, or unfairness to the 'Child that 'gets born? Th~X~ am
'
IS IS very
. h ' II .
Problematic , as we see In
t e ,0 owmg pair of examples, which I have ada t d f
Derek Par/it and Dan Brock40
p e rom
Angela and Betty
Angela .is p.regnant. Her doctor discovers that she has a condition that will result in mild
~ta~atlOn In her baby. The doctor prescribes a medication that will prevent the retardation
ut ngela does not want to take the medication, because a side effect of the medication i~
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that it can cause mild acne. So she does not take it and. as predicted, her baby is born mildly
retarded.

Betty wants to get pregnant. However, she is on medication that has the following side
effect: if she gets pregnant while on the medication, her baby will be born mildly retarded,

Going off the medication is not a feasible option, as it would adversely affect her health as
well as her fertility. Fortunately, she only needs to take the medication for a few months.
Her doctor advises her to wait to get pregnant until she is off the medication. But Betty does
not want to wait. She plans to visit her family during her summer vacation, and so she wants
to have the baby in June at the latest. She gets pregnant right away and bas a baby in June
who. as predicted, is born mildly retarded.

Most people would regard both Angela and Betty as having acted wrongly. I
certainly do. Both give birth to a mildly retarded child, when this easily could have
been prevented, and for reasons that are morally trivial. Morally, there seems to be
no difference between what Angela does and what Betty does. Those who agree
accept the "No-Difference View."41
However, as I argued earlier, there is a difference in the two cases, a difference

that ordinarily would affect our judgments of wrongdoing. The difference is that
Angela, but not Betty, has harmed her baby. By not taking the prescribed medication,
Angela has caused her baby to be born retarded, when he could have been born with
nonnal intelligence. She has caused him to be worse off than he otherwise would
have been, which is the ordinary straightforward conception of harming. But the
same is not true of Betty. She has not made her baby worse off than he would
have been, or could have been. There is no way that the child she had could have
been born with nonnal intelligence. There was nothing Betty could do to make him
mentally nonnal. Admittedly, by waiting until she was off the medication, Betty
could have avoided having a child who was mildly retarded. John Harris thinks
this is enough to say that Betty has harmed her child, but it is hard to see why.
Nothing Betty did or could have done could have prevented mental retardation in
the child born in June. Waiting would have enabled her to have a child with nonnal
intelligence, but it would have been a different chi/d, one conceived from a different
egg and a different spenn.
Some disability rights advocates would argue that neither Betty nor Angela
hanns her child because they reject the idea that it is possible to harm a child by
causing or allowing him to be born retarded. This is because they dispute the view of
disabilities generally as medical problems or as inherently disadvantageous. Instead,
they believe that disabilities, including mental retardation, are largely socially constructed, and become a disadvantage, or a handicap, when the world is not organized
to facilitate the abilities of the "differently abled." Mental retardation is not a
hannful or disadvantageous condition unless society chooses to make it so.
This socio-political model of disability has some truth in it. It is possible to make
changes in society to enable people with certain disabilities to have access to a range

of opportunities from which they were previously barred. Wheelchair ramps are a
good example. At the same time, not all disabilities are alike, and the claim that disability is completely, or even mostly, a social construction is surely an exaggeration.
While society can do a lot to improve the opportunities of those with developmental disabilities, there will always be opportunities foreclosed to them because of
their disability. This is a reason to view mental retardation as a harmful condition,
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and one to be avoided, if possible. This is entirely consistent with recognizing the
worth of individuals who have disabilities, including developmental ones, and their
42
contributions to their families, friends, and the world around them.
If mild mental retardation could be seen as making the child's life fall below a
decent minimum, we could argue that Betty, as much as Angela, harms her child.
But I deliberately chose mild mental retardation because it falls above that standard.
Individuals who are mildly retarded can go to school, make friends, get jobs, and
generally have lives that are well worth living, even if limited in various ways. This
being the case, we cannot say that Betty has harmed her baby. Nor will Betty fail to
fulfill her obligations to the child, like the I4-year-old girl would. So Betty cannot
be seen as wronging the child. On what ground, then, can we say that Betty acts
wrongly?
Melinda Roberts rejects the view that Betty has done anything wrong; that is, she
rejects the No-Difference View. Betty, Roberts says, has not harmed her baby; in
fact, given the absence of any third, better alternative for the baby, she's done the
best she could by him. This enables Roberts to retain the person-affecting restriction
(PAR) in her theory of morality, but at the high price of a completely implausible
judgment.
Is there a way to retain the PAR while maintaining that Betty acts wrongly,
indeed, just as wrongly as Angela? David Wasserman thinks this is possible.
He writes:
For me, the intuitive difference between choosing to have a child with a given impairment
rather than 1) no child or 2) a child without that impainnent is best explained by the fact
that the parent has a good reason for the choice in l}-it's the only child 'she can have-but
no obvious reason in 2)-why not wait? Once a reason is supplied in 2), e.g., the mother
wants to let her ailing parents get acquainted with their first grandChild, which they will
not be able to do if she waits the year necessary to avoid an impairment-the question is
whether that is a good enough reason, which may be debatable. But if it is, it justifies rather
than excuses her decision to have a child sooner-neither the child she has nor anyone else
is wronged, nor does the mother act wrongly in any sense, by acting on a decision made for
reasons that are respectful of the future child and compatible with the kind of relationship
she seeks to establish with it. 43

Does this explanation accord with the view that Betty acts wrongly? First, note
that in this example, the waiting period is one month, not one year. That is important
because while it might impose a significant burden to wait a whole year before
having a child, it is hard to see how waiting one month could impose a significant
burden, thus giving the prospective mother a good (or good enough) reason not
to wait. But second, and more important, the appeal to "good enough reasons"
demonstrates the need for impersonal reasons in the morality of beneficence. To

Wasserman's question, "Why not wait?" Betty has an answer. She plans to visit her
family during her summer vacation, and so she wants to have the baby in June at
the latest. Ordinarily, that would be a good enough reason for not wishing to delay
conception. No one would blame Betty or think the worse of her for timing her birth
to fit into her summer plans. So the question is, why isn't this a "good enough"
reason here? Once we acknowledge that Betty hasn't harmed or wronged anyone by
having the child with mild mental retardation, the demand for a better reason cannot
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be justified in person-affecting terms. It seems that either we have to give up the
judgment that Betty's act is wrong-or give up the PAR.
In giving up the PAR, we acknowledge that not all wrong acts are bad for someone. We give up the requirement that there must always be a victim of a wrongful
act. We could instead adopt the following principle: other things being equal, it is
wrong to have a child in a hannful condition if it is possible to have a different child
without the harmful condition. Philip Peters calls this the principle of avoiding harm
by substitution, or the substitution principle. for short.

8.7.2 The Substitution PrinCiple
The substitution principle says that when individuals have a choice, they "should
choose to bear the child who is likely to suffer the least."" While I accept the intuition that the moral requirement is to avoid "gratuitous suffering," that is, suffering
that could have been avoided, to insist that individuals must choose the child who
will "suffer the least" appears unduly perfectionist. It appears to require individuals to have the healthiest, happiest children they possibly could have, and to make
procreation, which falls short of this ideal, morally wrong. I suggest instead this
modification of the substitution principle:
Individuals who face reproductive decisions are morally required not to bring into the world

children who will experience serious suffering or limited opportunity or serious loss of
happiness, if this outcome can be avoided, without imposing substantial burdens or costs
or loss of benefits on themselves or others. by bringing into the world different individuals
who will be spared these disadvantages. 45

This principle is an impersonal principle. It is not person-affecting in that the
failure to substitute does not hann any individual, or make anyone worse off, even
in the appropriate counterfactual sense. There is no victim of a failure to substitute.
And yet, as Peters reminds us, there is a sense in which the substitution principle
is person-affecting: namely, that it is based on the badness of avoidable human suffering and limited opportunity. Concern to prevent human suffering can be seen
as person-affecting, in a sense, because, as Dan Brock notes, "suffering and limited
opportunity must be experienced by some person-they cannot exist in disembodied
form ...."46 Jonathan Glover makes a similar point when he says that comparative
impersonal principles, that is, those that compare amounts of suffering in the world,
are "rooted in people and their lives, rather than derived from mere abstract rules."47
This makes the incorporation of comparative impersonal principles into our morality
more palatable than it otherwise might be.

8.7.3 Avoiding Harm by Substitution in the Real World
The examples of Angela and Betty are philosophically interesting, but highly artificial. Most people faced with a risk of disability in their offspring cannot avoid it
simply by delaying conception for a few months. The details matter in determining
whether one would be violating the substitution principle.
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Consider prenatal testing and selective abortion. This can be viewed as a substi
tution method, since if the fetus is found to have a genetic or chromosomal disorde:
an abortion gives the couple the chance to "try again" in a future pregnancy to hav
another child who will not have the disease. This is, of course, unacceptable to thos
who oppose abortion and regard fetuses as the moral equivalent of born childre.
Even those who are generally pro-choice are likely to find abortion of a wante
child, especially if this is done in the second or third trimester, psychologically an
morally troubling. Because abortion can impose emotional burdens on the procrea
ing woman or the couple, it is not required by the substitution principle, which onl
requires substitution if it can be accomplished without the imposition of substa.
tial burdens. Moreover, undergoing amniocentesis increases the risk of miscarriag
which is another perfectly good reason for being unwilling to undergo it.
Another method of substitution is provided by preimplantation genetic diagn,
sis (PGD) and embryo selection. In PGD, embryos are created in vitro. A sing
cell is removed from each embryo and tested for genetic disease. Affected embry,
are discarded, and only those that are disease-free are selected to be implanted
the uterus. This affects the identity of who will get born. Is there an obligation
undergo PGD by individuals at high risk of transmitting a genetic disease? I do n
think that there is. For those who regard preimplantation embryos as having tl
moral status of human persons, PGD is no more morally acceptable than prena.
testing and selective abortion. If they have no obligation to abort, it is hard to s
why they would have an obligation to discard embryos. Moreover, PGD requir
NF, which is expensive, often ineffective, and imposes both burdens and physic
risks on the woman. For this reason, it is not required by the substitution principj.
The substitution principle might have applicability to certain procreative de,
sions, for example, the number of embryos to be implanted in an NF cycle. In t
United Kingdom, it was originally proposed that the number of embryos that m
be transferred in anyone cycle be limited to two, in order to reduce the incidence
multiple births, which have an increased risk of disability in the offspring. Howev
since this was likely to reduce live birth rates for older women, the policy that"
ultimately adopted was a maximum of two embryos per cycle for women uo(
forty, and three for women over forty. The Human Embryo and Fertilization Auth·
ity characterized this as "a reasonable balance between our overriding objective
reducing multiple births with the need to maximize a women's chance of havin:
healthy singleton baby."48
In the United States, there is no central authority determining how many embr:
can be transferred in anyone cycle, although there are guidelines which spec
that no more than two embryos should be transferred in women under the age
thirty-five, and no more than five in women over forty.49 The American Society
Reproductive Medicine has announced that infertility treatment is moving clo
to the goal of single embryo transfer, which "results in fewer multiple pregn
cies, by far (although monozygotic twinning is possible) and when performee
the appropriate patient population results in cumulative pregnancy rates as gOO(
those achieved with multiple embryo transfer,',5o However, some couples exprel
desire to have two or more embryos transferred because having twins enables th
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to "complete" their families with one round of treatment. They may be willing to
take the increased risk of disability to accomplish this goal. However, their interests
and goals are not the only relevant factors. Here, the substitution principle would
seem to impose on couples a moral obligation to transfer only one or two embryos,
as long as this gives them a reasonable chance of having a healthy singleton.

8.8 Conclusion
Genesis problems are challenging. but not insoluble. In particular, they do not
require us to discard the common-sense intuition that the welfare of offspring is
always a morally relevant consideration in procreative decision-making. It is wrong
to have children who cannot have minimally decent lives, although reasonable
people can disagree about what constitutes a decent minimum. Furthennore, such
judgments should be based on a realistic assessment of the facts, not stereotypical
thinking. In particular, it is important to remember that people can have lives that
are well worth living, despite disabling conditions or poverty. Nevertheless, there
are times when procreation is wrong, even though no one is harmed or wronged by
birth. To explain these cases, we need to supplement a morality of person-affecting
reasons with a comparative impersonal principle: the principle of substitution. This
will explain some of the difficult cases, although it is often not easy to say when
someone has an obligation to substitute. The morality of procreation, and the obligation to avoid procreation, is based partIy on an objective assessment of the likely
quality of the future child's life, but also on the reasons, intentions and attitudes of
those who would have children.
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17. Harris (2007), p. 94.
18. Actually, I prefer the expression "better off unconceived'.' to avoid t~.e question of wh,~ther
abortion would be in the child's best interest. However. Femberg uses better off unborn so I
will follow his usage here.
19. Robertson (1974-1975). p. 254.
.
20. This requirement is also placed on infants' surroga~ decision ma~ers in President's CommISsion on Ethical Problems in Medicine and BiomedIcal and BehaVIOral Research (1982).
. .
"
21. Feinberg (1987), p. 164.
22. See, for example. the cover story in Time Magazilre about Manssa and Amssa Ayala, The
Gift of Life," June 17, 1991 <http://www.time.com/time/coverslO.16641.19910617.00.html>
(accessed July 17,2008). See also Steinbock (2008)..
. .
23. Melinda Roberts calls cases in which there are three alternatives, one of which IS better than
existence under a disadvantageous cases, "type 3-alt" cases. See Roberts (1998), pp. 92-96
24. Individuals with severe intellectual impairments may want to have a baby, unaware th~t they
are not capable of caring for and raising a child. The fact that they are not aware of th~1T own
limitations in this respect does not entitle them to procreate. It falls to those responslbl~ for
them to prevent them from having children, both for their sake and for the sake of the child.
25. For an excellent treatment of the right of children to be loved. see Liao (2006), pp. 420-440.
Liao focuses on the right of existing children to be loved, and how this human right has pol~cy
implications. He does not proclaim a duty on the part of individuals t~ refrain .fro~ pr~creauon
where they cannot or will not love the child, but it seems to me consistent with hiS v~ew.
26. Kamm makes a similar point: "let us suppose that we should not create persons at Will unless
we have good reason to believe that they can have some-just how many is deliberately left
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open-number of years of life with some degree of health and welfare, and let us call these
things that they should have the minima," Kamm (1992), p. 132.

27. This position was taken in President's Commission on Ethical Problems in Medicine and

Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1982),
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Cohen (1997), p. 33.
Archard (2004), pp. 403-420.
Archard, op. cit.
Steinbock (1998), pp. 13-14.
Steinbock (1998), pp. 13-14.
Harris (1992), p. 91.
~ee the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 1948-1998 <http://www,un,orglOverview/
ng~ts.html.> (accessed July 28, 2005), and,the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European

UnIon. ArtIcle 9 <http://www.europarJ.eu.mtlcomparlllibelelsjlcharter/art09/defauILen.htm>
(accessed July 28, 2005).
35. 1 have adapted this example from Parftt (1986), pp. 358-361.

36. S,ee Lu.cile Packard Children's Hospital at Stanford, High Risk Newborn: Very Low
Blrthwelght <http://www.lpch.org/DiseaseHealthInfolHealthLibrary/hrnewborn/vlbw.html>
(accessed August I, 2005).
37. Another possibility is to conceive this example as a "third option" kind of case. Melinda
Roberts suggests that the alternatives are not life as a neglected child or no life at all. The
child could be born and not be neglected if all the other agents who might affect the child's
life-his father, his parents, the young girl's parents, and the community at large-help out.
And if they do not, the blame for the child's lack of well.being is not to be laid solely at her
do?r. Should the. girl r~frain fr?m having the child to prevent the others from wronging the
child? Roberts thmks thiS question need not be resolved. She writes, "Some agent has wronged
the child, according to personalism [her interpretation of the person·affecting restriction or
PARJ, and has, correspondingly, done something wrong. Someone remains, morally, on the
hook fo~ the wrong that has, by hypothesis, been done the child. To avoid the charge of an
u~con~clo?ably .Ioose moral sta,ndard-the charge that lies at the root of the fourteen.year-old
girl obJectIon-it seems that thiS result is all that is really required." Roberts (1998), p. 111.
38. Woodward (1986), p. 815.
39. Bene1heim (1987).
40. Parftt (1976); Brock (1995).

41. Parfit (1986), p. 367. By the No·Difference View, I mean simply the claim that there is no
nwral difference between what Angela does and what Betty does. One does not act more
wrongly than the other. The more generalized version of the No·Difference View holds that
the wrongnes,s of both acts must have the same explanation. Thus, if person·affecting reasons
cann?t expla~n the wrongness of Betty'S act, it cannot explain the wrongness of Angela's
act either. Th,IS leads Partit to reject person.affe~ting reasons altogether in the area of morality
concerned WIth beneficence and human well·bemg. For an excellent critique of the generalized
version of the No· Difference View, see Jeff McMahan (2001). I agree with McMahan that both
kinds of reasons, person·affecting and impersonal, are necessary in moral discourse and that
'
neither can be reduced to the other.
42. I argued for this in Steinbock (2000), pp. 108-123.
43. Personal communication from David Wasserman.
44, Peters (1989), p. 5 I 5; Peters (2004), especially Chapter 4; Peters (2009).
45. This is a simplification of a principle offered in Buchanan et al. (2000), p.249.
46. Brock (1995), p. 399.
47. Glover (1992), p. 142.

48. See Human Fertilisation & Embryology Authority, Chair's Letter CH(04)Ola. <http://www.
hfea.gov. uklHFEAGuidanceiChairsLettersArchivel2003_2004/CH040Ia> (accessed August
2,2005).
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49. See, for example, the Practice Committee of the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology
and the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (2004), pp. 773--774.
50. See the American Society for Reproductive Medicine Press Release on Single Embryo Transfer <http://www.asrm.orglMedialPress/singie..embryo.htmi> (accessed August 2. 200S).

References
American Society for Reproductive Medicine. Press release on single embryo transfer. 2 Aug.
2005. <http://www.asrm.orglmedialpresslsingle..embryo.html>.
Archard, D. 2004. Wrongfu1life. Philosophy 79: 403-20.
Benatar, D. 2006. Better never to have been: The harm ofcoming into existence. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Bettelheim, B. 1987. A good enough parent. New York: Alfred A Knopf, Inc.
Brock, D. W. 1995. The non· identity problem and genetic harms: The case of wrongful handicaps.
Bioethics 9(3/4): 269-275.
Buchanan, A., D. Brock, N. Daniels, and D. Wikler, 2000. From chance to choice: Genetics and
justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 9. 28 July 2005
<http://www.europarl.eu.inticomparlllibeJelsj/charter/art09ldefauILen.htm>.
Cohen, C. B. 1997. The morality of knowingly conceiving children with serious conditions:
An expanded "wrongful" life standard. In Contingent future persons, eds. N. Fotion and
J. C. Heller. New York: Kluwer Academic.
Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine. 2006. Ethics committee
report: Access to fertility treatment by gays, lesbians, and unmarried persons. Fenility and
Sterility 86(5): 1333-1335.
Feinberg, J. 1987. Wrongful life and the counterfactual element of harming. Social Philosophy &
Policy 4: 164.
The gift of life. 1991. Time Magazine. <http://www.time.com/time/coverslO.16641.19910617.QO.
html>.
Glover, 1. 1992. Future people, disability. and screening. In Justice between age groups and
generations. eds. P. Laslett and J. Fishkin. 127-43. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Goldberg. C. 2005. Experts debate age limits for childbearing; committee grapples with needs of
kids vs. those of parents. Chicago Tribune 8 Apr. 2005: 14.
Harris, 1. 1992. The wrong of wrongful life. In Wonderwoman and superman: The ethics ofhuman
biotechnology, ed. J. Harris, 91. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Harris, J. 2007. Enhancing evolution: The ethical case for making better people. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Heyd, D. 1992. Genethics: Moral issues in the creation of people. California: University of
California Press.
Human Fertilization & Embryology Authority, Chair's letter CH(04)Ola. 2 August 2005
<http://hfea.gov.uklhfeaguidance!chairslettersarchivel2003-2004/ch0401a>.
Kamm, F. 1992. Creation and abortion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Liao, M. 2006. The right of children to be loved. The Journal of Political Philosophy 14(4): 420-40.
Lucile Packard Children's Hospital at Stanford. Very low birthweight. 1 August 2005
<http://www.lpch.orgldiseasehealthinfolhealthlibrary/hrnewborn/vlbw.html>.
McMahan, J. 2001. Wrongful life: Paradoxes in the morality of causing people to exist. In
Bioethies, ed. J. Harris. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Morgan, D., and R. G. Lee. 1991. Blackstone's guide to the Human Fertilization & Embryology
Act 1990.
Parfit, D. 1976. On doing the best for our children. In Ethics and population, ed. M. Bayles.
Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Company.

178

B. Steinbock

Parfit, D. 1986. Reasons and persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Peters, P. O. 1989. Protecting the unconceived: Nonexistence, avoidability, and reproductive
technology. Arizona Law Review 31: 487-548.
Peters, P. G. 1992. Rethinking wrongful life: Bridging the boundary between tort and family law.
Tulane Law Review 67(2): 397-454.
Peters, P. G. 2004. How safe is safe enough? Obligations to the children qfreproduc:tive technology.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Peters, P. O. 2009. Implications of the nonidentity problem for state regulation of reproductive
liberty. In this collection.

The Practice Committee of the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology, and the American
Society for Reproductive Medicine. 2004. Guidelines on the number of embryos transferred.
Fertility and Sterility 82: 773-4.
Roberts, M. 1998. Child versus childmaker: Future persolls and present duties in ethics and the
law. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
Robertson, J. A. 1974-1975. Involuntary euthanasia of defective newborns: A legal analysis.
Stanford Law Review 27: 254.
Robertson, J. A. 1994. Children oj choice: Freedom and· the new reproductive technologies.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Steinbock, B. 1986, The logical case for "wrongful life." Hastings Cemer Report 16(2): 15-20.
Steinbock, B. 1992, Life before birth: The moral and legal status (~f embryos andjetuses. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Steinbock, B. 1998. Rethinking the right to reproduce, Working Paper Series Number 98.05
Harvard Center for Population and Development Studies: 13-14.
Steinbock, B. 1999. Why most abortions are not wrong. In Bioethics for medical education,
Advances in bioethics; v. 5, eds. R, B. Edwards and E, Bittar, 245-267. Stamford, CT: JAI
Press.
Steinbock, B. 2000. Disability, prenatal testing, and selective abortion. In Prenatal testing and
disability rights, eds. E. Parens and A. Asch, 108-23. Washington, D.C: Georgetown University
Press.
Steinbock, B. 2008. Using preimplantation genetic diagnosis to save a sibling: The story of Molly
and Adam Nash. In Ethical issues ill modern medicille: Contemporary readings ill bioerhics,
eds. B. Steinbock, A. J. London and J. D. Arras. 8th ed. New York: McGraw Hill.
Steinbock, B. and R. McClamrock. 1994. When is birth unfair to the child? Hasfing.~ Center Report
24(6): 15-21.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 1948-1998. 28 July 2005 <http://www.un.orgloverview/
rights.html>.
Woodward, J. 1986, The non-identity problem. Ethics 96: 804-831.

Other References
National Bioethics Advisory Commission. 1997. Cloning human beillgs: Report and recommendations v. /,2. Washington, D.C.
The President's Council on Bioethics. 2005. Alternative sources of human pluripotent stem ceIL..:
A white paper, 57, Washington, D,C.
The President's Commission on Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral
Research. 1982. Deciding loforego l!fe- sustaining treatment: A report on the ethical and legal
issues in treatment decisions. Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office.

